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BOOK REVIEW
Psychotherapy and Confidentiality: Testimonial
Privileged Communication, Breach of Confidentiality,
and Reporting Duties. By Ralph Slovenko. Springfield,
Illinois Charles C. Thomas, 1998. Pp. 640. Hard Cover.
$29.95
Reviewed by Alan W. Scheflin*
Now that the Industrial Revolution has stepped aside for
the dawning of the Information Age, the acquisition,
possession, and adroit use of private material is the new
currency, as collectable and tradable as antique art.
Preservation of confidences and secrets, in an era that
demands revelation, mandates a complete re-evaluation of
the moral and legal lines that bind professional therapists,
attorneys, and members of the clergy. E-mail, cell phones,
fax machines, computers, and the Internet attest to the
importance of information in the new millennial society.
Though not that ambitious, this book is a welcome
introduction to the intricate world of confidences and secrets.
Slovenko concentrates mostly on the legal obligations
imposed on therapists, but he does offer important references
to similar issues for lawyers and members of the clergy.
Slovenko's voice is worth hearing. He brings a depth of
scholarship and a lifetime of experience to his subject. His
writing is crisp, informative, and mercifully lacks either the
high moral tone of a person selling his own theory or the
convoluted arguments of a person performing an exegesis on
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arcane codes and texts. In short, the book is very readable
and delightfully peppered with humorous stories, anecdotes,
cases, and clippings that accentuate the points under
consideration. Given the length of the book, there are many
points that are in fact considered.
The book is divided into six parts. Part I, consisting of
five chapters, unravels the concept of Testimonial Privileged
Communication. Slovenko notes that privileges in general
violate the fundamental rule that courts of law are entitled to
everyone's evidence. By way of court proceedings or pre-trial
discovery, judges have the right to receive all relevant
evidence. California Evidence Code section 911(b)
memorializes this universal idea by stating that "No person
has a privilege to refuse to disclose any matter or to refuse to
produce any writing, object, or other thing." Privileges,
whether created by judges or legislators, permit relevant
information from being disclosed to courts. Because
privileges inhibit the receipt of important information, they
are narrowly construed. Discovery statutes, by contrast,
because they produce material evidence for courts, are
liberally construed.
The attorney-client privilege has been recognized for
centuries and it is the oldest privilege respected by law. As
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals noted in United States v.
Bauer:'
"The attorney-client privilege is the oldest of the privileges
for confidential communications known to the common
law." The defining principle behind this privilege is to
encourage full and frank communication between
attorneys and their clients and thereby promote broader
public interests in the observance of law and
administration of justice. The privilege recognizes that
sound legal advice or advocacy serves public ends and that
such advice or advocacy depends upon the lawyer's being
fully informed by the client. That purpose "requires that
clients be free to 'make full disclosure to their attorneys of
past wrongdoings."' The attorney-client privilege has deep
roots in this country's historical jurisprudence: The rule
which places the seal of secrecy upon communications
between client and attorney is founded upon the necessity,
in the interest and administration of justice, of the aid of
1. 132 F.3d 504 (9th Cir. 1997) (citations omitted).
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persons having knowledge of the law and skilled in its
practice, which assistance can only be safely and readily
availed of when free from the consequences or the
2
apprehension of disclosure.
The essence of the privilege was well stated by the California
Supreme Court in Verdelli v. Gray's Harbor Commercial Co.,'
"a client cannot be compelled to disclose communications
which his attorney cannot be permitted to disclose."4
The psychotherapist-patient privilege is at the other end
of the evolutionary scale. As Slovenko points out, the
privilege first appeared in Georgia in 1959. Prior to that
time, some therapists were covered under the variety of
physician-patient privileges adopted by some states. This
latter privilege was highly porous, however, and therapists
complained that it lacked sufficient protection for patient
secrets. Slovenko describes the historical developments that
led to the creation of the psychotherapist-patient privilege
culminating in the acceptance of the privilege by all fifty
states, and by the United States Supreme Court's extension
of the privilege to social workers in Jaffee v. Redmond.5
Part II, in nine chapters, describes a variety of
Psychotherapy and Privilege Problems, such as divorce
matters, child custody battles, criminal cases, commitment
issues, record keeping guidelines, and group therapy
complications. Therapists seeking an easy access route to
legal thinking will be benefited by the clear presentation
provided. Indeed, the book works best as an introduction for
mental health specialists without legal training. Reading
through these chapters reinforced my belief that graduate
psychology departments and medical schools should have
mandatory courses on ethical and forensic issues. It no
longer is possible to practice psychotherapy apart from an
understanding of ethical limitations and legal obligations.6
Part III, a short section of only two chapters covers
Termination of the Privilege. One chapter concerns waiver of
the privilege. It takes us on an engrossing journey from the
2. Id.
3. 47 P. 364, 366 (1897).
4. Id.
5. 518 U.S. 1 (1996).
6. See GEORGE J. ALEXANDER AND ALAN W. SCHEFLIN, LAW AND MENTAL
DISORDER (1998).
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medical privilege, through the clergy privilege, and into
discussions of fascinating recent legal controversies such as
the Claus von Bulow trial and the O.J. Simpson case. The
other chapter deals with the self-defense exception to the
professional privileges. It too has its share of legal drama
with discussions of the infamous Bean-Bayog case at
Harvard, the James Earl Ray assassination of Martin Luther
King, Jr. case, and the Patty Hearst case. Slovenko adds
excitement to these matters because his discussions are not of
the legal principles involved, but rather the tough strategic
choices attorneys and therapists must make behind the
scenes.
Part IV moves the reader more deeply into the process of
Psychotherapy and Confidentiality. Separating out the
distinctions between privilege and confidentiality is not easy,
as law students annually learn in courses on ethics and
evidence. The importance of confidentiality dates back
centuries before the creation of the first legal privilege. The
Hippocratic Oath, which still regulates the behavior of
healers after twenty five centuries, states that "Whatsoever
things I shall see or hear concerning the life of men, in my
attendance on the sick or even apart therefrom, which ought
not to be raised abroad, I will keep silence thereon, counting
such things to be as holy secrets."
The relationship between confidentiality and privilege is
well presented by Robert Simon and Robert Sadoff.7
Confidentiality refers to the right of a patient to have
communications spoken or written in confidence not
disclosed to outside parties without implied or expressed
authorization. Privilege-or, more accurately, testimonial
privilege-can be viewed as a derivation of the right of
confidentiality. Testimonial privilege is a statutorily
created rule of evidence that permits the patient as holder
of the privilege the right to prevent the psychiatrist to
whom confidential information was given from disclosing
it in a judicial proceeding.8
Simon and Sadoff note four sources of authority in the
law for safeguarding confidential information given to
professionals: (1) professional licensure laws and/or
7. ROBERT I. SIMON AND ROBERT L. SADOFF, PSYCHIATRIC MALPRACTICE:




confidentiality or privilege statutes, (2) the ethical codes of
the various professions, (3) case law protection of confidential
information, and (4) the constitutional right to privacy. At
various points in this book, Slovenko touches base with each
of these foundations.
A case not cited by Slovenko suggests the interesting
interplay between privilege and confidentiality. In State v.
Beatty,9 an impoverished mental patient confides to her
psychiatrist that she has committed a robbery to pay for food
for herself and a sick friend. Her psychiatrist called Crime
Stoppers with enough indirect information to allow the police
to make an arrest. The Missouri Court of Appeals held that
no privilege was involved because the telephone call did not
constitute "testimony." The court was sympathetic to the
patient, but it provided her no remedy:
That does not mean that we condone or approve of the
disclosure made in this case. The primary public policy
behind the physician-patient privilege statute is to inspire
confidence in the patient so as to encourage him to make
full and frank disclosures to his medical advisers as to his
symptoms and condition so that the physician may
properly treat his patient .... It seems to us that if a
physician, minister, priest, rabbi or attorney can employ
the subterfuge of an anonymous phone call to defeat the
confidentiality mandate[]..., then the public policy
purpose of the statute is meaningless. However,
determining public policy purposes of the statute is a
matter for the legislature, not the courts. If the
legislature sees fit to modify the confidentiality statute so
as to prohibit physicians, spiritual advisers or attorneys
from revealing to any other person, except under court
order, confidential communications they have received
from their patient, penitents and clients, it has a right to
do so; but, until it does, the only prohibition dictated by
the statute is that they cannot testify in a court
proceeding regarding such confidential communication.
We leave for another day the question of whether
revelations of the type made in this case by Dr. Butts are
an ethical violation on his part, as that question is not
before us.
Missouri changed its privilege statute, but the patient would
9. 770 S.W.2d 387 (Mo. 1989).
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have been no better off under the new provision, which
eliminated the privilege "when such information pertains to a
criminal act."'"
Slovenko provides an extensive examination of
California's Tarasoff case, including pictures of the
unfortunate victim and her killer. His discussion leads him
into the thickets of "foreseeability" theory and also
California's unique "direct victim" theory created in Molien v.
Kaiser Foundation Hospital." Slovenko's research falters,
however, in his discussion of post-Molien developments by
failing to report some crucial later court rulings. In fact,
"very few plaintiffs are successful in demonstrating that they
are 'direct victims.". 2  In a thorough review of every case
decided after Molien, a California Court of Appeals, in Bro v.
Glaser," acknowledged that plaintiffs usually lose the
argument that they are "direct victims." Bro noted that to be
a direct victim, plaintiff must show (1) a preexisting,
consensual relationship between the plaintiff and the
defendant, and (2) that defendant's conduct was sufficiently
outrageous to trigger, as a matter of public policy, an
obligation to compensate plaintiff.
In regard to medical and psychotherapy cases, the Court
of Appeals correctly noted in Martinez v. County of Los
Angeles, 4 that when the plaintiff is not the doctor's patient,
"courts have not extended the Molien direct-victim cause of
action .... ""
After Bro was decided, the "direct victim" issue again
arose in Underwood v. Croy.6 In this case, a wife had been
seeing a licensed therapist. One day, the wife never came
home, leaving her husband and two minor children to worry
about what happened to her. The husband discovered that
the wife and therapist were having an affair, and that the
affair was the reason the wife walked out. The court had no
difficulty holding that the husband and minor children were
10. Mo. REV. STAT. § 337.636(2) (1997).
11. 616 P.2d 813 (1980).
12. DANIEL BROWN, ALAN W. SCHEFLIN, AND CORYDON HAMMOND,
MEMORY, TRAUMA TREATMENT, AND THE LAW (1998).
13. 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d 894 (Ct. App. 1994).
14. 231 Cal. Rptr. 96 (Ct. App. 1996).
15. Id.





In its analysis, the Underwood court provided the clue to
analyzing the California cases by noting that the old
foreseeability approach, which had been popular with judges
and juries in the 1970s, has now been replaced with a "duty"
analysis that must be made by the courts. Clearly, California
judges shifted the power to decide these cases from juries to
themselves. It has always been clear in the law that juries
decide issues of foreseeability, whereas judges decide
questions involving to whom a duty may be owed. By holding
that "direct victim" questions are a matter of duty, not
foreseeability, California judges made it clear they did not
want the law extended beyond those to whom some
contractual duty or undertaking already existed. As the trial
judge in the Underwood case sagely observed:
The bottom line is that the question of duty, a matter of
law, is an issue of public policy. Our appellate courts may
wish to extend public policy to find a duty of care is owed
by a marriage counselor to his patient's various relatives
when his sexual exploitation of the patient destroys the
marriage which he was retained to help preserve. Such is
not the law under existing authority.
17
In an extremely difficult emotional case, Schwarz v.
Regents of the University of California," a California Court of
Appeals held that a father could not sue a psychotherapist on
a direct-victim theory where the father had retained the
therapist to treat his son but the therapist instead "facilitated
and concealed" the mother's removal of the child to England.
Even though the father had participated in counseling
sessions with the therapist to improve family
communications, the court held that the son was the only
patient. The court further noted that the existence of a
contract between the father and the caregiver for the
caregiver to provide treatment for a child does not "impose on
the caregiver a duty of care owed to the parent."
California's Smith v. Pust,9 case involved a therapist who
had sexual intercourse with a patient. The patient's husband
was held not to be a patient, and was also held not to be a
"direct victim" despite his attendance at some therapy
17. Id.
18. 276 Cal. Rptr. 470 (Ct. App. 1990).
19. 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d 364 (Ct. App. 1993).
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sessions.
After the extended treatment of potential harm to third
persons, Slovenko shifts to briefer discussions of (1) therapy
with important public figures, (2) teaching and publishing
case material, (3) special problems of working with children
and with hospital staff, (4) references, referrals, and
responses to nonmedical third parties, (5) collecting fees, and
(6) consent to release information. This material is well
referenced for the curious reader searching additional source
material, and the topics easily hold one's attention.
Part V contains three chapters on record keeping and
accountability. Strangely, Slovenko never locks horns with
the major debate in this area-how extensive should
psychological or psychiatric records be kept? Some
authorities insist that full documentation is necessary for the
integrity of the patient.
The single most important step that a psychiatrist can
take to limit the risk of exposure to a malpractice claim is
to maintain adequate patient evaluation and treatment
records .... Poor or absent record keeping may be the
result of a defensive fear that treatment notes could be
20used against the psychiatrist in court.
Others claim that fewer records mean fewer lawsuits.
According to Dr. Lifschutz, "The vulnerability of records to
subpoena has for many years affected the record-keeping of
psychiatrists. I keep practically no records-just keep the
information in my head. Once a patient leaves there usually
just isn't any written record."21 A third voice suggests that
records be kept defensively to anticipate lawsuits and pen in
defenses to them. In this litigious climate, with hundreds of
lawsuits brought against therapists, which path is the wisest?
Which path best serves the patient?
Fireworks fly in the final section, Evidential Value of
Therapist Versus Forensic Expert Testimony. Few subjects
are more controversial, especially after the United States
Supreme Court decision in Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc.22 Throughout the book, Slovenko's
roots in the False Memory Syndrome Foundation were largely
20. See ROBERT I. SIMON, CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAw 39 (2d ed.
1992).
21. Stephen, Keeping a Patient's Secrets, S.F. CHRON., Aug. 6, 1973, at 17.
22. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
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kept in check, though an occasional reference to what he calls
"the recovered memory" controversy erupts in the text. In
this section, Slovenko fails to cover up this perspective.
Interestingly, after quoting the Ethical Guidelines for the
Practice of Forensic Psychiatry of the American Academy of
Psychiatry and the Law (AAPL) insistence on "honesty and
striving for objectivity," Slovenko almost exclusively cites the
literature favoring the false memory view, and he ignores the
massive literature on the other side. He generally cites and
describes cases raising false memory or repressed memory
issues with a slant favoring his own pre-existing beliefs, and
he fails to cite substantial evidence contrary to his
perspective. For example, he makes the wildly inaccurate
observation that "recollections of childhood traumata that
come up for the first time in therapy are not credible evidence
of actual events"23 Slovenko fails to mention that every study
in the world directly related to repressed memory, has shown
the phenomena to be real. Not a single scientific study
anywhere supports his view. 4
Slovenko himself has raised a new threat to the integrity
of confidentiality in his argument that therapists should be
"detectives" before believing their patients. 5 In all fairness,
he does discuss my critical response to this position. 6 The
reader may decide which viewpoint is more acceptable.
An additional threat to the protection of confidences is
the poor empirical base for the argument that people only
confide in therapists because they know their secrets will be
kept. Is it true that the mental health, legal, and clerical
23. RALPH SLOVENKO, PSYCHOTHERAPY AND CONFIDENTIALITY:
TESTIMONIAL PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATION, BREACH OF CONFIDENTIALITY 530
(1998).
24. See Daniel Brown, Alan W. Scheflin, and Charles L. Whitfield,
Recovered Memories: The Current Weight of the Evidence in Science and in the
Courts, JOURNAL OF PSYCHIATRY & LAW (April 1999). Assessing the entire
literature, not just one side of the debate, the authors reject Slovenko's position
on the grounds that it lacks scientific support. Id. Their book received AAPL's
highest award-the 1999 Manfred S. Guttmacher Award, co-sponsored by the
American Psychiatric Association.
25. Ralph Slovenko, "I'm Not a Detective" in "Revival of Memory," presented
at a Conference on Law, Science and Society sponsored by the American Bar
Association in Detroit, Michigan (April 29, 1995).
26. See Alan W. Scheflin, Narrative Truth, Historical Truth and Forensic
Truth, in THE MENTAL HEALTH PRACTITIONER AND THE LAW: A
COMPREHENSIVE HANDBOOK 299-328 (1998).
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professions could not function without confidentiality? When
patients or clients visit professionals, do they really know
about the principles of confidentiality? Are they aware of the
exceptions that require or permit professionals to reveal
information? These questions motivated some researchers to
study whether confidentiality was essential to therapy.
Shuman & Weiner surveyed lay persons, and others, and
concluded that most people who seek mental health help do
not know about the privilege, and ninety-three percent of the
people surveyed reported that even if no privilege existed,
they would seek professional help for "serious emotional
problems."27 They present strong arguments supporting the
abolition of the psychotherapist-patient privilege based upon
the public's lack of awareness of the privilege, but they do not
address one significant question: can therapists do their work
as effectively if they know that nothing will remain
confidential?
So many exceptions exist to privilege that is often
considered illusory. The main exceptions involve
involuntary hospitalization proceedings, court-ordered
examinations, criminal proceedings involving the patient,
will contests, child custody disputes, child abuse
proceedings, a legally required report, and the patient-
litigant exception by which the patient raises his or her
mental or emotional condition as an element of a claim or
defense in a legal proceeding.28
In California, psychologists routinely hand out to their
patients during the first session a "Miranda" warning list of
fifteen to twenty situations in which confidences may be
violated. Patients do not appear to have been stifled in their
self-revelations. Should confidentiality be further limited?
Every state, and the federal system, recognizes a
psychotherapist-patient privilege. When the issue was
addressed in the Jaffee case by the United States Supreme
Court, only Justice Scalia voted to reject the privilege.
Justice Scalia's argument against the psychotherapist
privilege is centered on his belief that only therapists have
been given this protection from revealing the secrets of
27. Daniel W. Shuman & Myron S. Weiner, The Privilege Study: An
Empirical Examination of the Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege, 60 N.C. L. REV.
893 (1982).
28. ROBERT I. SIMON, CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW 58 (2d ed. 1992).
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others. In a crucial passage he states:
When is it, one must wonder, that the psychotherapist
came to play such an indispensable role in the
maintenance of the citizenry's mental health? For most of
history, men and women have worked out their difficulties
by talking to, inter alios, parents, siblings, best friends
and bartenders-none of whom was awarded a privilege
against testifying in court. Ask the average citizen: Would
your mental health be more significantly impaired by
preventing you from seeing a psychotherapist, or by
preventing you from getting advice from your mom? I
have little doubt what the answer would be. Yet there is
29
no mother-child privilege.
Interested readers will certainly profit from reading
Slovenko's excellent book. Indeed, the issues it discusses, in
our modern age of information trafficking, make this book
essential reading. I know of no better introduction to the
scope of the controversies covered within its pages.
29. Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 36 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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